Faculty Research Talk: Xiaofei (Sophie) Pan
Team incentives, productivity and choices: a real-time real effort experiment
Using a real-time real effort experiment, we ask how a group-threshold team incentive affects productivity. A group threshold is a mechanism where team members only receive their payoffs when their group’s total output has reached a certain target. Our first question is to ask under what conditions the group threshold work to promote productivity. Our second question is to investigate whether productivity varies when group members share the group earnings under either Equal, Piece rate or Winner-Takes-All. Results of both questions are consistent with a variant guilt aversion model where the low skilled members feel the guilt towards the high skills who expect to share the group earnings proportionally to their productivity. We also find when teams are asked to choose their preferred sharing mechansim, those under threshold are more likely to demand to share equally than those who are not due to the need of cooperation under threshold.
- Thursday, September 26, 2019
- 3:30pm - 4:30pm
- Bryant University